黑格爾本體論構造之邏輯缺陷
戴榕菁（加拿大蒙特利爾麥吉爾大學工學院博士）
關鍵詞：
黑格爾，邏輯學，本體論，有，無
摘要：
黑格爾本體論的核心概念是純無（pure nothing）和純有（pure
being1）以及它們之間的轉化（becoming）。在他的《邏輯學》裡黑格爾是通過對於哲學起點的探索來推出純無與純有的特性以及它們之間的統一和轉化的。但是，在過去兩個世紀裡當人們研讀及運用 黑格爾哲學時卻忽略了對於其本體論建構過程的邏輯論證的檢驗。本文將結合著《邏輯學》
原文的內容，逐步查考他建構本體論之核心內容過程中的論證邏輯，並由此指出其中的缺陷。
一． 引言
黑格爾哲學，尤其是他的著名的辯證邏輯和現象學理論對於過去兩個世紀的西方主流哲學 的發展有著巨大的影響。黑格爾哲學著作中最爲著名的應該是他的《邏輯學》，而黑格爾
《邏輯學》的一個名聲便是其論證過程依循著嚴格的邏輯，至少黑格爾本人不但是努力這樣做的，而且在《邏輯學》的引言中明確指出他的邏輯學的建構是不依賴於任何預設前提 而完全是邏輯自行運作的結果2。但是，黑格爾之後的人們卻是象對待傳統的形上學而不 是象對待傳統的邏輯學那樣地對待黑格爾的邏輯學，人們一般都是把對於黑格爾《邏輯學》
的解釋（不論是自己的解釋還是他人的解釋，甚至是從他人介紹黑格爾《邏輯學》的文章 中總結出的結論）拿來進行討論或同曆史上其他人（諸如康德）的哲學理論進行對比，而
不是去研討黑格爾引以爲自豪的建構他的邏輯學理論的邏輯論證過程。這便導致了這樣一 個奇怪的現象：經曆了兩個多世紀的時間，有過無數睿智學者的研考，人們居然會忽視了
本文將要討論的黑格爾在他的哲學論述過程中的邏輯缺陷。而這種現象的出現與黑格爾的 哲學論述風格恐怕是不無關聯的。黑格爾哲學以其語言之晦澀難懂而著稱，他在進行哲學
論述時經常不是擇要而論或平鋪直敘，而是習慣於鋪展很廣甚至繞著彎子來說話，他的這一風格曾引來包括叔本華在內的一些人的不滿，叔本華甚至爲此而對黑格爾的哲學進行過
嚴厲的抨擊。
本文將要討論的是黑格爾在他的傳世名著《邏輯學》中建構他的本體論過程中所存在的邏 輯缺陷，而他的本體論建構也是他將傳統的形上學與傳統的邏輯學用被後人稱爲辯證邏輯
的框架來統一表述5的關鍵核心內容。雖然過去兩個世紀裏有包括前面提到的叔本華以及 羅素6和波普爾7在內的不少人對黑格爾的辯證邏輯提出批評，但是卻沒有人指出本文所討論的黑格爾在構建他的本體論時所存在的邏輯缺陷。實際上，由於黑格爾《邏輯學》中的
本體思想對於黑格爾邏輯學之重要性，日後人們在運用黑格爾的辯證邏輯（或辯證法）時
所遭遇的許多問題都源自本文所討論的黑格爾構建本體論時的邏輯缺陷。
黑格爾本體論的核心概念是純無（pure
nothing）和純有（pure being）以及它們之間的 統一和轉化（becoming），而黑格爾是通過對於哲學起點的探索來推出純無與純有的特性 以及它們之間的統一和轉化的。因此，爲了要更好地了解黑格爾本體論的建構邏輯，我們
有必要結合著《邏輯學》原文的內容，逐步查考他的邏輯論證過程；但是另一方面，鑒於 黑格爾的哲學論述的冗長特征，我們也有必要按照黑格爾的邏輯線條將黑格爾的論述簡化
爲一些要點。
www.marxists.org 網站所提供的 A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin 於 1969 年出版 的黑格爾《邏輯學》8的英譯本不但原譯本的語句通順而且網站的組織也很有條理，非常 便於閱讀及查考，本文接下來對於黑格爾《邏輯學》的討論將以該網站的英譯本爲參照。
本文所需引用的《邏輯學》原文部分的中文內容均爲由上述網站的英文直接翻譯而來，相
關的英文內容在《邏輯學》中具體位置及網上的鏈接都作爲參考文獻標示出來；另外，爲 兼顧方便讀者查考和節省正文版面，本文還將所引用的英文原文放在文章後面的附錄裏。
接下來我們依據黑格爾的思路從“哲學起點的存在性”，“什麽是哲學的起點”，“從無到有的跳躍”，和“黑格爾本體論構建的完成”這樣四個方面來對黑格爾本體論的構建進 行查考分析。
二．哲學起點的存在性
如果要通過尋求哲學的起點來推出純無與純有的意義，那麽從邏輯上來說，首先第一個問題就是哲學是否有起點。在這個問題上黑格爾的處理是相當含糊的。他的思路的第一步是將哲學的起點轉化爲邏輯的起點來進行討論，我們從《邏輯學》中的如下內容可以看出這 一點：
§629 然而，對於什麽是哲學的真正方法的解釋屬於對於邏輯的處理範圍；因爲哲學的方法是以邏輯的內容的內在自我運動的形式出現在意識中。
…
§9010
…如果說對早期的抽像思維來說哲學原理僅僅是其內容，那麼隨著哲學本身的發展，它的 注意力開始包括思維的另一邊即認知過程的特點，這意味著主觀的行爲也已經被理解爲客 觀真理的一個基本部分，這就需要將哲學的方法與內容結合起來，形式與原理結合起來。 所以哲學原理本身也應該是起點，而且思維的內容的起點的也應該是思維的過程的起點。
黑格爾先是在上面的第一段裏指出哲學的方法一定屬於邏輯的範圍，然後在上面的第二段裏指出 方法與內容是統一的，思維對像的起點也應該是思維過程的起點，這樣就暗含了哲學的起點應該是邏輯學的起點的意思。在接下來的幾段裏黑格爾更是明確地指出哲學的起點其實就是邏輯的起 點：
§91
我們在這裏（即對於哲學起點的討論---本文作者注）只需考慮邏輯的起點是如何發生的；
這個起點的兩邊是已命名的，也就是說，或者是作爲推論的結果，或者是作爲一般意義上 的起點，即可直接感受點。
…
§93 之所以是邏輯的起點是因爲它是作為自由和自爲的思想的元素產生的，處於純粹的知道之中。
§94 邏輯是純科學，也就是在他自身發展的整個範圍內的純知識。
…
§98 但是如果沒有任何一個預設前提而起點本身又是一個可直接感受的，那麼它的唯一的確定特性就是它將是邏輯的起點，是思想自身的起點。
黑格爾的這種處理方法會給讀者帶來這樣的疑問：既然這是一部討論邏輯學的書，爲什麽 不直接討論邏輯的起點而要繞個彎子從哲學的起點來過渡到邏輯的起點？黑格爾這樣做對
他來說有一個便利，那就是他可以借助當時的曆史背景來很自然地引出哲學的起點這個議 題：
§88
只是在近代思想家們才意識到找到哲學的起點的難處，並且對於爲什麽困難以及如何解決這一困難的可能性進行了大量的探討……
這一看來並不起眼的便利對於黑格爾來說恐怕並非只是順便之舉而是特意而爲。我們知道， 如果要對不論是邏輯的起點還是哲學的起點進行討論，首先面臨的一個問題應該是邏輯
（哲學）是否有起點？思維缜密的黑格爾應該是考慮到這個問題的，但是他顯然沒有找到 一個邏輯嚴格的答案或者他可能根本找不到這樣一個邏輯嚴格的答案。因此，在這一點上
他不得不采取一些技術性地繞彎子的做法將它含糊過去，上面提到的用曆史的背景來引出這個問題是他的這個含糊措施的一部分，在接下來的§89 裏我們可以看到他的這個含糊
措施的下一步：
§89
當然，哲學原理（之內容）本身也表示了（一定有）一個起點，但不是主觀的起點而是像 其它任何東西的起點一樣的客觀起點。所謂原理一定有特定的內容---水，一，生活智慧，
想法，物質，單極子，等等。或者，如果它指的是認知的特性及相應地只是作為標准而不 是客觀確定性---思想，直覺，感覺，自我，主觀本身。在這裡人們感興趣的僅僅是內容。
另一方面，單純的起點，作為引出討論之特殊的非基本的方式的意義上的主觀之物仍然未 被考慮過，被人們忽略了，而相對於似乎是人們唯一感興趣的尋找哲學原理的需要來說， 找到“起點應該由什麼構成”這樣的問題的答案的需要似乎顯得很不重要,人們感興趣的 僅是什麼是真理，什麼是絕對的基礎。
這段话通过以对比的方式映衬出寻找哲学起点的重要性，其本身仍然是暗示着這一起點的 存在，但是在隨後的討論中他卻從未嚴格論證這一起點一定是存在的，盡管他確實解釋和
反思了曆史上有關如何尋找這一起點的不同說法。他在後面的第§95 到§116 似乎以嚴 格的邏輯從正反兩面論證了邏輯學的起點是存在的，但實際上他的所有論證都是建立在邏 輯學（哲學）的起點一定存在這個預設前提之下的，然後在這個前提下找到了他的邏輯學 的起點11，那就是純無與純有的統一體。所以說，黑格爾對於邏輯學的起點的論證存在一 個邏輯漏洞，那就是他沒有真正證明這個起點一定是存在的。
三．什麽是哲學的起點
接下來我們擇要複習一下黑格爾如何（在起點一定存在的隱含前提下）從正反兩面來論證
邏輯的起點就是純無（pure
nothing）與純有（pure being）的統一體的。首先，繼前面
§93 所說的邏輯的起點是純知道（pure knowing）之後，他在§96，§97 以及§99 中指 出，純知道只包含單純的可直接感受性（immediacy）因而就是一個什麽都不包含的純有， 所以邏輯的起點一定是一個純有。
然後從§101 到§116 這幾節中，黑格爾進一步對於邏輯（哲學）的起點是什麽進行了論 述，值得指出的是這個過程所進行的論證是邏輯嚴格的。由於他的論述內容比較冗長，我
這裏不引用原文而是將它簡化爲如下的要點：
首先，在§101 到§102 中黑格爾先是借評論他人的觀點引出了一個類似於老子所說的 “進道若退（《道德經》12第四十一章）”的尋找哲學起點的思路，也就是黑格爾在§102 所說的“前進就是回到它的基礎（the advance is a retreat
into the ground）”。按 照這個思路，黑格爾從§102 到§104 論述了如何從一個任意點出發去找它的原因，然後
再找那個原因的原因，一直推到最原始的起點爲止。這樣找到的起點既是可直接感受的
（immediate）又是可推論的（mediated），因爲它如果能用來作爲原因解釋其它的內容 那麽它一定是直接感受的，但同時因爲它是通過倒退回去找到的，那麽它一定又是可推論 的。§105 和§106 強調這樣找出的起點一定不是假設的而是實實在在的作爲真實起點的 邏輯內容。
然後，在後面的§107, §109, 以及§113 到§116 中黑格爾反複地使用了一個反證邏輯， 我們可以將這個反證邏輯簡化表達爲：
哲學的起點一定是沒有任何內容的空無。這是因爲假定哲學的起點是非空的 ABC（這裏的 ABC 是意義或內容或方法而不是名字），那麽我們就可以去找關於 ABC 的 解釋，因而它就不是真正的起點。所以哲學的起點一定是沒有任何意義的空無。
當然，上述反證邏輯的成立還需要一個前序鋪墊:對內容進行邏輯解釋時不能用 A=A 的循 環論證，因爲那樣的論證給不出任何有意義的新信息。黑格爾已經在《邏輯學》前言的§2713完成了這一邏輯鋪墊。
在§108 中黑格爾繼續前面關於哲學的起點一定是在純知道（pure knowing）之中因而一 定是純有（pure being）的論述。這一節的下面這段話裏的邏輯值得注意：
§108 這裏剛開始時，還不具備對象內容，哲學只是一個空洞的單詞，或者一個假設的未經合理
化的概念。純知道只能提供這樣一個負面的判斷，告知我們起點是一個抽象的概念。如果我們把純有作爲純知道的內容的話，那麽後者必須從自己的內容後退一步，允許它自由地 運行而不去進一步地對它加以確定。
在這裏他強調當我們最開始談論哲學時它只是一個完全沒有內容的空概念，我們的知道也 是一種沒有內容的純知道；如果非要強調這種純知道的內容的話，那麼它的內容就是空洞
的純有。我個人認爲他這裏的論述之合理性是值得存疑的，因爲即便是將意識的作用引入 到我們對於哲學起點的思考當中來，當我們選擇了“哲學”這個名字而不是“飛機”或者 其它任何名字的話，我們在意識中已經賦予了這個名字的具體涵義，試圖將這個名字與它 的涵義分割開來是違背有關語言的心理學原理的。
四．從無到有的跳躍
從 §110 到§112 是關鍵性的三節，這三節的論述中的主要邏輯前提有三點：1）前面的 討論已經顯明哲學的起點既是純有又純無; 2）純無與純有是不同的；3）哲學的起點雖然 是純無但是含有進一步發展的種子或者說作爲純無的起點實際上指向了下一步的發展。
應該說，黑格爾在這三節的論述不象他對於哲學的起點一定是空洞無物的論證那樣有著嚴 格的邏輯。首先，他在§110 裏說了這樣一段話：
由於雖然還只有無但將要成爲非無的存在，這個起點不是純無，而是一個將要成爲具體事 物的無；所以，有也已經被包含在這個起點裏了。這個起點於是包含了有與無兩者，是有 與無的統一體；或者說是一個既是有的非有，又是非有的有。
這裏我們需要注意到，黑格爾在這三節之前之後都邏輯嚴格地反複指出了哲學的起點是空 洞的無或純有，可是當遇到如何從空洞的無進入到不空洞的有的關鍵點時，他開始說那個
起點不是純無，且將在別的地方所說的起點裏的純有（pure
being）改成有（being）。 在下面的§111 裏他又繼續說，“在起點裏的無與有是不同的。”這與他在其它地方說哲 學的起點是什麽都沒有的空洞的純有與純無而且在§134 裏幹脆指出純有就是純無的說法 是矛盾的。黑格爾肯定意識到了這裏的矛盾，但是他並沒有努力去從邏輯上解決這個矛盾，
而是從文字上將別的地方用的純有（pure being）改成有（being）純無（pure nothing）
改成無（nothing），然後再說起點裏的有與無是不同的。這裏我們可以感受到黑格爾試
圖在理論上從空洞的無向非空洞的有跳躍時所經曆的內心掙紮。
而他在這幾段的掙紮裏面所用到的看似合理的依據就是既然起點是從無到有之點，那麽起 點裏就應該包含從無到有的因素。除了前面§110 中給出的相關表述之外，在§111 中他
又說：
因爲起點指向其它地方---它是一個帶有指向作為對照物之有的參照體的非有；它既開始 了，又還沒開始，它只是在成爲不是空的有的路途之中。
在§112 中他对§110 和§111 中的论述做了总结，指出：
關於起點的分析得出了有與無的統一----或者，更明確地說，確定性與非確定性的統一， 或者同一性與非同一性的同一。這個概念可以被認為是關於絕對的最初始的，最純的，也 就是抽像的定義----如果我們真在乎關於絕對的定義的形式的話。在這個意義上，那個抽 像的概念是關於絕對的最初始的定義，一切其它的確定與發展都僅僅是對這個定義的進一 步細化和豐富而已……
在黑格爾之後的哲學界不但普遍接受了黑格爾這裏的看似是邏輯論證的文字說明，還將它 的表述作爲了被稱爲黑格爾辯證邏輯的核心內容之一，而人們接受這種說明的主要理由是
它符合自然與社會所發生的實際。但問題是，黑格爾這樣的說明在邏輯上是不嚴格的，最 多只能算是基於構建理論之需要的權宜之計而已；如果要堅持嚴格地不違背思維邏輯的話，
那麽當黑格爾遇到無法從空洞的開端跳躍到不空洞的存在時，他應該醒悟到：這表明他的 整個論證的邏輯前提有漏洞，應該推倒從來。我在前面也已經指出了他的一個最基本的邏
輯漏洞就是他沒有能夠證明他所要尋求的哲學的起點是存在的，那是他的整本《邏輯學》 的致命缺陷。
可是，如果我們堅持黑格爾在這裏的處理是邏輯上不妥的話，又該如何解釋後人所說的黑 格爾的這種空洞的起點中含有生成不空洞的未來的種子的說法符合自然與社會之現實這一
點呢？
首先，我們應該認識到問題並不出在用一個看似空洞的起點可以含有從無到有的種子這樣 的命題來解釋自然或社會，因爲那樣的命題是對於自然和社會的合理抽象，比如我們從懷 有胚胎的母親的生産這一類的現象便可抽象出看似空洞的起點可以含有從無到有的種子這 樣的命題來。但是，相應的現實經驗對應的只是看似空無的起點，而不是邏輯上嚴格的絕 對空無的起點。當你把這些經驗抽象爲絕對空洞的起點中含有生成不空洞的未來的種子的 命題時，實際上人爲地創造了一個作爲嚴格意義上來使用的邏輯命題。
黑格爾在§110 到§112
的處理方法實際上是人爲地引入了一個預設的邏輯：“哲學的起 點是包含了有的種子因而可以發展爲有的純無 。”這樣的命題本身不是邏輯自身運行的 結果而是人爲地抽象制造出來的邏輯。我們來看一下黑格爾自己如何在《邏輯學》的引言 中論述爲什麽他的《邏輯學》不應該用到任何外加的預設前提：
§3314
沒有哪個學科像邏輯學那樣地需要直接以它的考察對像而不是一些預設前提來開始的。在 任何一個其它的學科裏，考察對像和學科的方法彼此之間是不同的；而且學科的內容本身 也不構成它的絕對的開端，而是依賴於與之相關的其它各方面的材料。於是那些學科允許 以定義的形式來談論它們的基礎和內容及方法，並且就這樣（假設為熟知的加以接受，然 後就直接運用）配合普通的推理來建立它們的一般概念和基本定論。
§34 但是，邏輯學正相反，它不能以任何上述形式的思考以及思維規律來作爲它的前提條件，因爲所有這些都是它自身的內容因而必須在它自身內部建立起來。不僅是這個學科的方法，
就連這個學科內的概念本身都屬於作爲這個學科的內容，而且屬於它的結果；我們無法預 先定義什麼是邏輯，相反有關這個知識應該首先作為結果而出現在這個學科整體的理論之中。類似地，在這個學科裏最基本的一點是將思維或者更確切地說是理解性的思維作爲邏輯的考察對像；邏輯的概念必須是在這探索過程中産生因而不能預先設定。所以，本引言 沒有打算如果過去人們習慣的那樣來預先建立邏輯學的概念或設定它的方法；這裏僅是通 過一些說理和對曆史的反思及解釋來使得這門學科更容易被一般的思維所理解。
在這一段裏，黑格爾指出了因爲邏輯是用來解釋所有存在的內容的，包括邏輯本身，因此 對於邏輯的研究不能從任何諸如公理體系那樣的預設前提出發，而只能運用邏輯本身一步
步地展開論述。如果我們允許直接從類似懷有胚胎的母親的生産的實際經驗裏抽象出一個 邏輯前提然後運用到邏輯學之中的話，那麽就與黑格爾在引言第§34 中說的邏輯學的內 容只能依靠邏輯自身的運行而不能預設前提的說法相矛盾, 因爲那樣的前提就不是如黑格 爾試圖表明的由純粹的邏輯運行所産生的結果。
其次，更爲嚴重的是黑格爾人爲地引入的上述那個附加命題顯然在形式邏輯上與黑格爾在 其它地方得出哲學的起點是空洞的純無與純有的統一這一結論的論證邏輯相矛盾；而之所
以會出現這個矛盾的根本原因在於黑格爾其實在一開始就沒有能夠做到引言§34 中的不 預設任何前提的說法，因爲他的《邏輯學》顯然是有一個隱含的前提假設的，那就是哲學 的起點是存在的。可以看出，黑格爾在如何處理由無到有的跳躍這一點上是有過內心的掙 紮的，但是他顯然沒有意識到作爲他掙紮的結果所引入的邏輯命題不是邏輯體系自身運行
的結果，而是人爲的附加品。之所以說他掙紮是因爲他在《邏輯學》不同的地方爲了引入 及論證從空洞的無到不空洞的有的跳躍的邏輯采用了各種不同的並不屬於邏輯論證的理由；
之所以說他沒有意識到這一點是因爲他並沒有因此而回去修改引言中的§33-§34。
另一方面，我們也有必要認識到引入上述的人爲抽象出的邏輯命題對於黑格爾的《邏輯學》 後面內容的構建所具有的重要性：這一附加邏輯使他實現了無法由邏輯的自身運行來實現
的從無到有的跳躍。缺少了這一跳躍他不但無法通過尋找哲學起點來建構他的本體論，更 重要的是他根本就無法實現將形上學（metaphysics）作爲客觀邏輯（objective logic） 與傳統的邏輯統一爲一個新的哲學體系的雄心。因此，本文上述的討論實際上向我們指出 了黑格爾將形上學與傳統的邏輯進行統一的關鍵性前提條件是通過形而上的抽象來引入一個非邏輯自然運行結果的人造邏輯命題而實現的。這就是爲什麽黑格爾的貌似邏輯嚴格的
辯證邏輯體系在日後的運用會有時出現一些似是而非的結果的原因。
五．黑格爾本體論核心建構的完成
在§110 到§112 這個關鍵性處理完成之後，如前面提到的，黑格爾在§113 到§116 中又
回到用嚴格的邏輯對哲學的起點一定是空無的論證之中，這樣一來他之後在§121 和
§122 中做出哲學起點應該是空無的結論就要比直接在§110 到§112 的討論後面來下這 一結論顯得自然的多。從§117 到§120 是他對其他人的觀點一些反駁，在這反駁上黑格 爾是有的放矢的，但因爲他所反駁的觀點不是我們目前所面臨的問題，我們就沒有必要在
這裏討論了。
接下來值得一看的是黑格爾在《邏輯學》的第一捲第一部第一節的第一章的 A 到 C
（§132 到§13415）這三節裏對於純有，純無，及它們之間的轉化生成（becoming）的討 論和總結。在其中的 A 他說道：
有，純有，沒有任何進一步的細節。在它的不確定的直接可感受性中它只與自己相同…… 有，不確定但直接可感受的，實際上是無，而且不比無多也不比無少。
在其中的 B 他說道：
無，純無：它只是簡單地等同於自己，完全地空，缺乏所有的細節和內容---在它自身內 的無區別性……所以，無與純有是同樣的確定性，或同樣地缺乏確定性，因而完全一樣。
在 C 節裏他說道：
所以，純有和純無是一回事。真理既不是有也不是無，而是有進入---不僅是進入而是已 經進入---無，而且無進入有。但是它們之間又同樣地不是無法區別的，相反地，它們不 是完全一樣的，它們是絕對可以區分的，但它們又是沒有分開並且無法分開的而是彼此瞬 間消失在對方之中。因而它們的真理是一個進入另一個的瞬間消失的運動：轉成，一個彼 此可以被區分的運動，而它們之間的差別也同樣地立即消失。
至此黑格爾實際上完成了他的所謂辯證邏輯中的關鍵性的人工邏輯的初步建構，之後他在 緊接下來的幾個注釋（Remark 16）裏又進一步對上面的建構進行補充解釋。其中比較有
意思的是在§164 裏他通過對詞彙的雙關語義的運用再次論證了哲學的起點一定是什麽都 沒有的無：
當然作爲這門學科起點的有其實是無，因爲我們可以從所有的存在中抽象出具體的有，而 當我們把所有的存在都進行了抽象之後，就什麽也沒有剩下了，所以那個在所有存在之外 的開頭就一定是什麽也沒有了，也就是無。
上面那段話的意思是如果其它一切都被排除在起點之外的話，那麽起點就只能是什麽都沒 有的無。那段中譯文原本應該在“什麽也沒有剩下了”那裏結束。但是那樣的話，原文中通 過語義的運用來表達的意思就消失了。所以我特意在原文的基礎上補充了“所以那個在所 有存在之外的開頭就一定是什麽也沒有了，也就是無”這句話。但是，在“什麽也沒有剩下了”那裏黑格爾顯然又遇到前面在§110-§112 那裏所面臨的如何從純無跳到不是無的有的挑
戰，所以在§164 接下來他又再從不同的角度來進行處理。這一次比較有意思的是他居然 提到中國哲學裏的無中生有來作爲他的理論的佐證：
其實把無作爲起點（如同在中國哲學裏那樣）的做法不需要讓我們大驚小怪，因爲在我們 這麽做之前這個無已經轉化爲有了。
另外，他在之前的§136 裏也用到古希臘的赫拉克利特的哲學來作爲他自己的有無轉成的
本體觀的佐證：
與那樣的簡單片面的抽象相反，思想深刻的赫拉克利特提出了高等的關於轉成的整體概念 並且說：有與無一樣地渺小，或者，一切都在流動，這意味著，所有的都是轉成。
但是，雖然黑格爾對於哲學起點的尋找以及最後得出的關於純有（pure being），純無
（pure nothing），和轉成（becoming）的理論被認爲是黑格爾的本體論的核心也是他
的邏輯學的基本，他在《邏輯學》一書中並沒有單純地從這個起點出發推導出任何內容來；
盡管有無轉化的思想貫穿著他的整本書，後人也僅是將黑格爾的轉化生成的理論當作一個
理念來解釋現象或指導實踐，而無法用作邏輯推導的基本出發點。我們可以泛泛地用本體 論的口吻說，轉化生成是宇宙間一切存在的基本，我們卻無法象推導公式那樣地單單從轉
化生成來推出任何結論來，它只能作爲解釋現象的一個基本條件而已。
一個一開始似乎是要作爲一切邏輯的起點的內容，最後只能用作泛泛的哲學理念；而另一 方面，不論是要提出純有的概念還是純無的概念或是轉化生成的概念，都沒有必要以那種
貌似嚴格的邏輯推理的方式來進行。不但可以象老子以形而上的經驗抽象的方式用“天下 萬物生於有，有生於無”，“有無相生”，“歸於無極”，“無有入無間”，“故有之以爲利，無 之以爲用”那樣直接地表達出有與無的本體意義來，也可以如巴門尼德和赫拉克利特那樣 以詩歌的形式表達出來。我們甚至可以把黑格爾的建立在有無及其相互轉化基礎上的本體
論看成是將巴門尼德與柏拉圖關於有無的論述與赫拉克利特關於有無及其轉變的思想的結
合，完全沒有必要象黑格爾那樣大費周章。
最後必須指出，本文所討論的是黑格爾對於他的本體論的核心概念的論證過程。而黑格爾 的本體思想實際上貫穿於他的整本《邏輯學》之中，是它的被稱之爲辯證邏輯的有機組成 部分。黑格爾在《邏輯學》中將本文前面提到的轉化生成的本體思想運用於對千百年來人 們所熟悉的一些形上學的概念的分析討論，並在分析中形成了一個被稱爲黑格爾的辯證法
的哲學方法。因爲它不但具有一個比較完整的體系，而且可以用比較簡單的形式總結表達 出來（與黑格爾理論本身的繁複冗長形成對比），所以得到哲學界及非哲學界的廣泛接受
和運用，對過去兩個世紀裏的地球文明産生了巨大的影響。另外，本體論及與之相關的辯 證邏輯只是黑格爾哲學的一部分，他的現象學突破了在真理形成過程中隔在人類主觀與客
觀之間的帷幔，他關於絕對理念在自然與精神上的表現的論述也繼柏拉圖強調絕對理念之
後再次引起世界對於絕對理念的意義的重視（盡管如他自己一再強調的，他的絕對理念的
意義與柏拉圖的不同）。總之，黑格爾的哲學在人類哲學的發展史上有著裏程碑式的重大 影響。
六．結束語
通過對於名著《邏輯學》的一些具體細節的查考我們可以看到德國哲學巨匠黑格爾在他的
哲學論述中的一些邏輯上的欠缺；這些欠缺並不會減損黑格爾因其對於人類哲學進步所做 的無可否認的巨大貢獻而擁有的在世界哲學界的崇高地位。對於這些欠缺的識別可以幫助
我們更加准確地在人類整體文明中對龐大的黑格爾哲學體系進行定位，幫助解釋過去許久 以來人們在應用黑格爾哲學時存在的一些疑問，而不是試圖對黑格爾哲學體系進行否認。
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附錄 本文所引用的黑格爾《邏輯學》內容之英譯文
§33
In no science is the need to
begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary reflections, felt
more strongly than in the science of logic. In every other science the subject
matter and the scientific method are distinguished from each other; also the
content does not make an absolute beginning but is dependent on other concepts
and is connected on all sides with other material. These other sciences are,
therefore, permitted to speak of their ground and
its context and also of their method, only as premises taken for granted which,
as forms of definitions and such-like presupposed as familiar and accepted, are
to be applied straight-way, and also to employ the usual kind of reasoning for
the establishment of their general concepts and fundamental determinations.
§34
Logic on the contrary, cannot
presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking, for these
constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the
science. But not only the account of scientific method, but even the Notion
itself of the science as such belongs to its content, and in fact constitutes
its final result; what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this
knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of
the whole exposition. Similarly, it is essentially within the science that the
subject matter of logic, namely, thinking or more specifically comprehensive
thinking is considered; the Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of
exposition and cannot therefore be premised.
Consequently, what is premised in this Introduction is not intended, as it
were, to establish the Notion of Logic or to justify its method scientifically
in advance, but rather by the aid of some reasoned and historical explanations and
reflections to make more accessible to ordinary thinking the point of view from
which this science is to be considered.
§62
However, the
exposition of what alone can be the true method of philosophical science falls
within the treatment of logic itself; for the method is the consciousness of
the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.
§88
It is only in recent times that thinkers have
become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the
reason for this difficulty and also the possibility of resolving it has been
much discussed…
§89
The principle of a philosophy does,
of course, also expre
ss a beginning, but not so much a subjective as an objective
one, the beginning
of everything. The principle is a particular determinate content — water, the one, nous, idea, substance, monad, etc. Or, if it refers to the nature of
cognition and consequently is
supposed to be only a criterion rather than an objective determination — thought,
intuition, sensation, ego, subjectivity itself. Then here too it is the nature
of the content which is the point of interest. The beginning as such, on the
other hand, as something subjective in the sense of being a particular,
inessential way of introducing the discourse, remains unconsidered, a matter of
indifference, and so too the need to find an answer to the question, With what
should the beginning be made? remains
of no importance in face of the need for a principle in which alone the
interest of the matter in hand seems to lie, the interest
as to what is the truth, the absolute ground.
§90
…If earlier abstract thought was interested
in the principle only as content, but
in the course of philosophical development has been impelled to pay attention
to the other side, to the behaviour of the cognitive process, this implies that
the subjective act has also been grasped as an essential moment of objective
truth, and this brings with it the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the
principle. Thus the principle ought also to be the beginning, and what is the
first for thought ought also to be the first in the process of thinking.
§91
Here we have only
to consider how the logical beginning appears; the two sides from which
it can be taken have already been named, to wit, either as a mediated result or
as a beginning proper, as an immediacy.
§93
The beginning is
logical in that it is to be made in the element of thought that is free and for
itself, in pure knowing.
§94
Logic is pure science, that
is, pure knowledge in the entire range of its development.
§98
… But if no presupposition is to be made and
the beginning itself is taken
immediately, then its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of
logic, of thought as such…
§101
The insight that
absolute truth must be a result, and conversely, that a result presupposes a
prior truth which, however, because it is a first, objectively considered is
unnecessary and from the subjective side is not known — this insight has
recently given rise to the thought that philosophy can only begin with a hypothetical
and problematical truth and therefore philosophising can at first be only a
quest. This view was much stressed by Reinhold in his later philosophical work
and one must give it credit for the genuine interest on which it is based, an
interest which concerns the speculative nature of the philosophical beginning.
The detailed discussion of this view is at the same time an occasion for
introducing a preliminary understanding of the meaning of progress in logic
generally; for that view has a direct bearing on the advance; this it conceives
to be such that progress in philosophy is rather a retrogression and a
grounding or establishing by means of which we first obtain the result that
what we began with is not something merely arbitrarily assumed but is in fact
the truth, and also the primary truth.
§102
It must be
admitted that it is an important consideration — one which will be found in
more detail in the logic itself — that the advance is a retreat into the
ground, to what is
primary and true, on which depends and, in fact, from which originates, that with which
the beginning is made. Thus consciousness on its onward path from the immediacy
with which it began is led back to absolute knowledge as its innermost truth.
This last, the ground, is then also that from which the first proceeds, that
which at first appeared as an immediacy. This is true in still greater measure
of absolute spirit which reveals itself as the concrete and final supreme truth
of all being, and which at the end of the development is known as freely
externalising itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate being
—opening or unfolding itself [sich entschliessend ] into the creation of a
world which contains all that fell into the development which preceded that
result and which through this reversal of its position relatively to its
beginning is transformed into something dependent on the result as principle.
The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the
beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be
within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also
the first.
§103
We see therefore
that, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to consider as result that
into which the movement returns as into its
ground. In
this respect the first is equally the ground, and the last a derivative; since
the movement starts from the first and by correct inferences arrives at the
last as the ground, this latter is a
result. Further, the progress
from
that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further
determination of it, hence that which forms the starting point of the development remains at the base of all
that follows and does not vanish from it. The progress does not consist merely in the derivation of an other, or in the effected transition
into a genuine other; and in so far as this transition does occur it is equally
sublated again. Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and
preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely
immanent in its further determinations.
§104
Through this
progress, then, the beginning loses the one-sidedness which attaches to it as
something simply immediate and abstract; it becomes something mediated, and
hence the line of the scientific advance becomes a circle. It also follows that
because that which forms the beginning is still undeveloped, devoid of content,
it is not truly known in the
beginning; it is the science of logic in its whole compass which first
constitutes the completed knowledge of it with its developed content and first
truly grounds that knowledge.
§105
But because
it is the result
which
appears as the absolute ground, this progress in knowing is not something
provisional, or problematical and hypothetical; it must be determined by the
nature of the subject matter itself and its content.
§106
The said beginning is
neither an arbitrary and merely provisional assumption, nor is it something
which appears to be arbitrarily and tentatively presupposed, but which is
subsequently shown to have been properly made the beginning; not as is the case
with the constructions one is directed to make in connection with the proof of
a theorem in geometry, where it becomes apparent only afterwards in the proof
that one took the right course in drawing just those lines and then, in the
proof itself, in beginning with the comparison of those lines or angles;
drawing such lines and comparing them are not an essential part of the proof
itself.
§107
Thus the
ground, the reason,
why
the beginning is made with pure being in the pure science [of logic] is
directly given in the science itself. This pure being is the unity into which
pure knowing withdraws, or, if this itself is still to be distinguished as form
from its unity, then being is also the content of pure knowing. It is when
taken in this way that
this pure being,
this
absolute immediacy has equally the character of something absolutely mediated.
But it is equally essential that it be taken only in the one-sided character in
which it is pure immediacy, precisely because
here
it is the beginning. If it were not this pure indeterminateness, if it were
determinate, it would have been taken as something mediated, something already
carried a stage further: what is determinate implies an other to a first. Therefore, it lies in the very nature of a beginning
that it must be being and nothing else. To enter into
philosophy, therefore, calls for no other preparations, no further reflections
or points of connection.
§108
For here at the start,
where the subject matter itself is not yet to hand, philosophy is an empty word
or some assumed, unjustified conception. Pure knowing yields only this negative
determination, that the beginning is to be abstract. If pure being is taken as
the content of pure knowing, then the latter must stand back from its content, allowing it to have free play and not
determining it further.
§109
But the determination of being
so
far adopted for the beginning could also be omitted, so that the only demand would be that a pure beginning be made. In that case, we have nothing but the beginning
itself, and it remains
to be seen what this is. This position could also be suggested for the
benefit of those who, on the one hand, are dissatisfied for one reason or
another with the beginning with being and still more so with the resulting
transition of being into nothing, and, on the other hand, simply know no other
way of beginning a science than by presupposing
some general idea, which is then analysed,
the
result of such analysis yielding the first specific concept in the science. If we too were to observe
this method, then we should be without a particular object, because the
beginning, as the beginning of thought, is supposed to be quite
abstract, quite general,
wholly form without any
content; thus we should have nothing at all beyond the general idea of a mere beginning as
such. We have therefore only to see what is contained in such an idea.
§110
As yet there is nothing and
there is to become something the beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing
from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained
in the beginning. The beginning therefore contains both, being and nothing, is
the unity of being and nothing; or is
non-being which is at the same
time being, and being which is at the same
time non-being.
§111
for the beginning points to
something else — it is a non-being which carries a
reference to being as to an other; that which begins, as yet is not, it is only
on the way to being.
§112
The analysis of the beginning
would thus yield the notion of the unity of being and nothing —
or, in a more reflected form, the unity of differentiatedness and
non-differentiatedness, or the identity of identity and non-identity. This concept could be regarded as the first, purest, that is, most
abstract definition of the absolute — as
it would in fact be if we were at all concerned with the form of definitions
and with the name of the absolute. In this sense, that abstract concept would
be the first definition of this
absolute and all further determinations and developments only more specific and
richer definitions of it. But let those who are dissatisfied with being as a beginning because it passes
over into nothing and so gives rise to the unity of being and nothing, let them
see whether they find this beginning which begins with the general idea of a beginning and with
its analysis (which, though of course correct, likewise leads to the unity of
being and nothing), more satisfactory than the beginning with being.
§113
But there is a still further
observation to be made about this procedure. The said analysis presupposes as
familiar the idea of a beginning, thus following the example of other sciences.
These presuppose their subject-
matter and take it for granted that everyone has roughly the same general idea
of it and can find in it the same determinations as those indicated by the
sciences which have obtained them in one way or another through analysis,
comparison and other kinds of reasoning. But that which forms the absolute
beginning must likewise be something otherwise known; now if it is something
concrete and hence is variously determined within itself, then this internal relation is
presupposed as something known; it is thus put forward as an immediacy which,
however, it is not; for it is a relation only as a relation of distinct
moments, and it therefore contains mediation
within itself. Further, with a
concrete object, the analysis and the ways in which it is determined are
affected by contingency and
arbitrariness. Which determinations are brought
out depends on what each person just finds in his own
immediate, contingent idea. The relation contained in something concrete, in a synthetic unity, is necessary only in so far as it is not just given but is produced by the
spontaneous return of the moments back into this unity — a movement which is the opposite of the analytical procedure,
which is an activity belonging to the subject-thinker
and external to the subject matter itself.
§114
The fore going shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot
be made with anything concrete,
anything containing a relation within itself.
For
such presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition of which the
concrete, now become simple, would be the result. But the beginning ought not itself
to be already a first
and an other; for anything which is in its own self a first
and an other implies
that an advance
has already been made. Consequently, that which constitutes the
beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as something
unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty being.
§115
If impatience
with the consideration of the abstract beginning should provoke anyone to say
that the beginning should be made not with the beginning, but straightway with
the subject matter itself, well then, this subject matter is nothing else but
the said empty being; for what this subject matter is, that will be explicated
only in the development of the
science and cannot be presupposed by it as known beforehand.
§116
Whatever other form the beginning takes in the attempt to begin
with something other than empty being, it will suffer from the defects already
specified. Let those who are still dissatisfied with this beginning tackle the
problem of avoiding these defects by beginning in some other way.
§121
…this simple determination which has no other meaning of any kind, this
emptiness, is
therefore simply as such the beginning of
philosophy.
§122
This
insight
is itself so simple that this beginning as such
requires no preparation or
further introduction; and, indeed, these preliminary,
external reflections about it
were
not so much intended to lead up to it as rather to eliminate all preliminaries.
§132
Being, pure
being, without any further determination.
In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself…
Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact
nothing, and neither more nor
less than nothing.
§133
Nothing, pure
nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all
determination and content — undifferentiatedness in
itself…Nothing is,
therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus
altogether the same as, pure being.
§134
Pure Being and
pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor
nothing, but that being — does not pass over but has passed over — into
nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not
undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same,
that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and
inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is
therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other:
becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which
has equally immediately resolved itself.
§136
Against that
simple and one-sided abstraction the deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward
the higher, total concept of becoming and
said: being as
little is, as nothing is,
or, all flows, which means, all is a
becoming.
§164
of course the being
which is made the beginning of the science
is nothing, for abstraction can be made from
everything, and if abstraction is made from everything then nothing is left over.
…
that now the beginning
should be made with nothing (as in Chinese philosophy), need not cause us to
lift a finger, for before we could do so this nothing would no less have
converted itself into being.
参考文献及尾注
1 西語中的 being 一詞在中文裏也譯成“存在”，但是因爲西語裏與 being 密切相關卻又具有不同的哲學涵義的 existence 在中文裏
也被譯成“存在”，所以，本文在不造成誤解的前提下，將西語中的 being 譯成“有”。
2 本文後面具體查考《邏輯學》內容時會討論相關的細節。
3 Arthur Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality, 1840, trans. Arthur Brodrick Bullock, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.,
1903
4 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, 1844, trans. K. B. Haldane, M.A. and J. Kemp, M.A., London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner
& Co., 1909
5 這裏需要強調一點：雖然黑格爾努力將傳統形而上學與傳統邏輯學統一于他的被稱爲辯證邏輯的框架中，他從未如很多人常誤以爲
地那樣否認過作爲文明構成部分的傳統形而上學的邏輯地位，這一點從他在《邏輯學》通篇中對于形而上學的內容極其重要性的討論
中可以看出。而人們對于這一點的誤解曾導致他們將黑格爾作爲錯誤地批判形而上學的例子。
6 Bertrand Russell, The History of Western Philosophy, 1945, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc
7 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, London: Georger Routledge & Sons, LTD.
8 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, trans. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York:
Humanity Books, 1969, 網上鏈接：https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/hl_index.htm
9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, trans. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York:
Humanity Books, 1969, Introduction： General Notion of
Logic, 網上鏈接：
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlintro.htm#HL1_43, §62
10 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, trans. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York:
Humanity Books, 1969, Volume One-Book One:
With
What must Science Begin?, 網上鏈接:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbegin.htm, §88,§89,§90,§91,§93,§94,§95- §116, §
121-§122
11 先假設一種答案的存在然後再找出這種答案其實是應用數學上常用的一種方法。從嚴格的邏輯（包括嚴格的數學邏輯）來看，這種
方法是有缺陷的，但是在應用數學上卻常常是一種有效地找到正確答案的途徑。不過由于黑格爾這裏的討論的問題涉及到整個人類文
明的邏輯基礎，這裏用類似于應用數學的便宜之計所存在的邏輯上的不嚴格其實可以成爲一個致命的缺陷。
12 老子，《道德經》，句讀參考王弼版本
13 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, trans. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York: Humanity Books,
1969,
Preface to the First Edition, 網上鏈接：
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlprefac.htm#HL1_31，§27
14 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, trans. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York:
Humanity Books, 1969, Introduction: General Notion of Logic, 網上鏈接：
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlintro.htm#HL1_43，§33-
§34
15 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, trans. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York:
Humanity Books, 1969, Volume One-Book One-Section One-Chapter 1 Being, 網上鏈接：
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbeing.htm#HL1_81，§132-§134
16 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, Volume One-Book One-Section One-Chapter 1 Becoming: Remarks, 網上鏈接：https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl083.htm#HL1_83，§135-§183
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