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The Personal And The Impersonal (I)


李敬恆


Introduction


The way Thomas Nagel understands the central problem of political theory, namely the
reconciliation between the individual and collective interests, is unique and original. He considers it
"not primarily as a question about the relation between the individual and society, but in essence and
origin as a question about each individual's relation to himself". The fundamental problem is the
conflict within each individual between two standpoints, the personal and the impersonal.


According to Nagel, human beings can occupy two different points of view. On the one hand,
we can see thing from where we are, with that I we happen to be as the center of perception. In
doing so, we are viewing the world from a personal standpoint, which gives rise to a partial and
individualistic concern for oneself. From this standpoint, we concentrate mainly on our personal
interests, and the further the others are related to us, the less their interests to us.


On the other hand we are also "able to think about the world in abstraction from our particular
position in it" . We can ignore, from the description of the situation, the fact that a particular
standpoint is our own. We then view from the impersonal standpoint, from which I am just one
among the many, and the situation is taken impartially.


The fact that we can occupy both the personal and impersonal standpoints gives rise to the
unsolved problem in political philosophy. To Nagel, any plausible and realistic social
arrangement should be legitimate. The problem as Nagel says, that


.............[t]he impersonal standpoint in each of us produces.... a powerful demand for
universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint gives rise to
individualistic motives and requirements which present obstacles to the pursuit and
realization of such ideal.


If a social arrangement cannot adequately reconcile the conflict between the two standpoints, it
cannot command the unanimous acceptance from the individuals, and thus will not be legitimate.
According to him, if a political ideal merely accommodates to our impersonal standpoint, it
would be utopian, i.e. motivationally impossible.


The view that our personal interests must be given a more or less equal status as our impartial
concern for the society in evaluating a given social arrangement leads Nagel to regard the conflict
between the personal and impersonal standpoints of primary importance. However, why must we
give so much weight to the individual self-interests when we make a moral assessment of a social
arrangement? Is it really as important as claimed by Nagel?


This paper is an attempt to find out what should be regarded as the central problem in political
philosophy. I shall argue 1. that the conflict between the personal and impersonal standpoints is
not important; and 2. that what is important is the conflict within the impersonal standpoint, i.e.
the conflict among the different demands from our impartiality.


I. The Significance of the Conflict between the Personal and the Impersonal Standpoint


A. Two Criteria for the Validity of a Political Ideal


In political philosophy, our ultimate aim is to construct and justify a valid political ideal. A
political ideal is valid if and only if it is both morally acceptable and practically possible.


To be valid, a political ideal must be morally acceptable. We will not rationally accept any
political or social arrangement which is unjust or immoral, no matter how efficient it is. A
political ideal is morally acceptable if it could not be reasonably rejectecl. Any unreasonable and
irrational objection cannot undermine the moral acceptability of a political ideal. Even the fact
that most members of a society reject a given social arrangement, simply saying that they do not
like it without any further argument, cannot make the arrangement in question less acceptable
morally.


On the other hand, it must be also practically possible. By practical possibility of a political
ideal, I means the possibility that humans, or most of the humans, could lead or could come to
lead the form of life ascribed by it through certain feasible process of social and mental
development. Essentially, it is expressed in its psychological acceptability. A social arrangement
is practically possible only if it is motivationally possible, i.e. it must be derived from at least one
of our view points, which can motivate us to accept it. If it is only imposed on us externally, and
we have no internal demand for it, we will not have any reasonable, motivational ground to accept
it. Nor will it be motivationally possible if the view point from which it is derived has no
motivational force on us. A social arrangement which demands the poor people to give all their
properties to the rich ones is not practically possible, for it cannot command our motivation to
accept it.


Although a political theory which is practically impossible cannot be valid and plausible,
what should he done in political philosophy is not to show how a social arrangement can be put
into practice (e.g. how to make the people accept a certain social arrangement), which is the task
of the politicians. For it involves a lot of practical problems which are morally irrelevant to the
value and the ethical status of a political theory itself. Rather, the task of a political philosopher
is ethical and theoretical, i.e. to justify that a given theory is morally acceptable and practically
possible.


According to Nagel, a political ideal should be legitimate. A legitimate political ideal is one
which reconciles the personal and the impersonal standpoints. It is because, in his view, a
political ideal would be practically impossible (though it may be morally acceptable) if it ignores
the demand of our personal standpoint. For we would not reasonably accept an arrangement
which cannot accommodate to our partial, individualized self-interests. As he says:


A fully realized social ideal has to engage the impersonal allegiance of individuals while at
the same time permitting their personal motives some free play in the conduct demanded
by the system, thus permitting the co-existence and integration of elements in each
individual's makeup which are potentially at war with one another.


Is it really the case? In examining the view of Nagel, we can first distinguish the following
four kinds of political ideals according to their ability to accommodate the demand of our
personal and impersonal standpoints:


Ideal 1: It can accommodate the demand of both our impersonal and personal
standpoints.


Ideal 2: It can accommodate the demand of our impersonal standpoint but not
that of the personal one.


Ideal 3: It can accommodate the demand of our personal standpoint but not that
of the impersonal one.


Ideal 4: It can accommodate the demand of neither the personal nor the
impersonal standpoint.


We can now decide which of them is/are valid by appealing to the two criteria of validity, i.e.
the moral acceptability and practical possibility. In doing so, we can discover which part of the
individual self, i.e. the personal or the impersonal standpoint, or both, is/are necessary in
determining the validity of a political ideal.


Firstly, Ideal 1 is valid. In satisfying both our impartial claim of the impersonal standpoint
and the partial concern for individual self-interests of the personal standpoint, it is both morally
acceptable and practically possible.


Secondly, Ideal 4 is not valid for it is neither morally acceptable nor practically possible.
Failing to accommodate to our impartiality which is the essence of morality, it can be reasonably
rejected on the ground that it is not moral. On the other hand, we would not have any motivation
to come under it, since none of our standpoints are accommodated by it.


Both the validity of Ideal I and the invalidity of Ideal 4 are obvious, for both of the criteria are
satisfied and not satisfied respectively. What would happen in conflicting cases, i.e. ones in
which only one of the criteria is satisfied? Since both the moral acceptability and the practical
possibility are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of a political ideal, the
unfulfilment of either of them will denounce the validity of the ideas.


Accordingly, Ideal 3 is not valid, for it fails to take up our impersonal standpoint and thus is
morally unacceptable. However, is Ideal 2 also invalid by the same reasoning? That is, can we
say that its failure to accommodate the personal standpoint entails its failure to command the
practical possibility? Nagel will claim that it is, for he regards that the neglect of the demand
from the personal standpoint will leave no motivational ground for us to accept it. His view
implies that the satisfaction of our partial interests is the sole ground of practical possibility.
That is why he assigns so much weight to our personal standpoint that its demand can play a
dominant role in accessing the validity of a political ideal. If he is right, only Ideal 1 is valid. It
means that unless a political ideal can successfully reconcile our impersonal and personal
standpoint, it cannot simultaneously fulfill the two criteria of validity, and thus cannot be valid.
This is where the significance of the conflict between the two standpoints in Nagel's theory lies.
(待續)

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