Homepages of Hong Kong Society of Humanistic Philosophy http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/~hkshp Mencius and Xunzi on the ultimate source of morality by KWAN Sui-chi (PhD Student, Humanities, HKUST; Tutor, OUHK) Introduction One of the most striking facts about Chinese Philosophy is the heavy emphasis it places upon the discussion of human nature. What is no less striking is that this discussion always pivots around the relation between human nature and morality. Despite the variety of versions of human nature proposed by philosophers from Mencius, Xunzi, Gaozia in the Pre-Chin Period to Dai Zhenb in the Qing Dynasty, they can be put under two categories, depending on what is taken as the ultimate source of morality, viz., that theory of human nature which advocates an inherent theory of morality that takes the ultimate source of morality to be, as its name readily suggests, inherent in human nature and that which champions an external one that takes the ultimate source of morality to be, again as its name readily suggests, external. This paper seeks to explore the views to which Mencius and Xunzi subscribe with regard to the ultimate source of morality in relation to human nature by way of examining the different versions of human nature endorsed by the two philosophers. It does so first by distinguishing the two theories of morality in their own right and then goes on to further explicate them in the context of Mencius's debate with Gaozi and Xunzi's view on Lic. It finally concludes that while Xunzi does more justice to the existential situation in our common daily life, it is nevertheless flawed and therefore less attractive as a philosophical argument. I. Inherent theory of morality vs. External theory of morality An inherent theory of morality is a claim about the ultimate source of moral knowledge. It holds that moral truths find their source in certain features of the mind. These are features which, going beyond a mere capacity to acquire moral knowledge from the outside, through pedagogical means or via personal experience, already predispose us in a moral direction, and from which moral knowledge can be derived. According to this theory, there are inherent in our nature certain spontaneous affective reactions of the mind which, quite apart from the influence of external codes, already predispose us in directions which the mind can recognize as moral, and so as worthy of further development. On this account, although the intellectual capacity to discern the demands of an objective moral code is recognized as one of the basic features of the human mind, it is still not primary, and thus not inherent in a way that the predisposition of the mind to moral acts is. By contrast, the external theory of morality patronizes the view that our moral knowledge is grounded in the outside, in the social setting in which we find ourselves in. It asserts that moral truths are something that reside in the interplay of human interaction and that moral principles are contrived out of social necessity. These truths and principles are acquired by pedagogical means or through personal experience rather than what already exists in human mind. This is equivalent to saying that moral knowledge is not inborn, that the human mind is not so constituted as to embrace moral knowledge prior to its entering any social relations. Or put in our terms, the ultimate source of moral knowledge is believed to be acquired. II. Mencius' inherent theory of morality A. Debates with Gaozi: whether yid is external or not a. Gaozi's view: One of the most important rivals contemporary with Mencius is Gaozi who holds that human nature is neither good nor bad. He says, (1) "Human nature is like that ch'i willow. Dutifulness is like cups and bowls. To make morality out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow."[1] (2) "Human nature is like whirling water. Give it an outlet in the east and it will flow east; give it an outlet in the west and it will flow west. Human nature does not show any preference for either good or bad just as water does not show any preference for either east or west."[2] (3) "The inborn is what is meant by 'nature'"[3] (4) "Appetite for food and sex is nature. Benevolence is internal, not external; rightness is external, not internal"[4] For Gaozi, as revealed here, the xinge, or nature, of a thing is the way the thing naturally is. Although he is not consistent in his view of human nature, the overall idea here is that moral truths exist independently of the mind. The mind has the capacity to comprehend such truths, but in itself it has no inherent moral direction and does not provide us with moral guidance. But it can gain moral direction by exercising its capacity to grasp independently existing moral truths. This interpretation of Gaozi's view is in line with Yat-shing Sham who, in his long and thorough analysis of 6A:4, takes Gaozi's external theory of rightness (yi) to be a kind of "ethical objective or descriptive naturalism"[5], which maintains that moral judgment is tantamount to, or dependent on, objective factual judgment. According to Sham's analysis, what Gaozi amounts to say in this verse is that the mere fact that the old man in my clan is old or that the old man in Ch'uf is old is sufficient to imply respects for them. But since judging whether someone deserves respect is a kind of value judgment, rather than of a factual kind, the mere fact without, at least, a moral imperative to the effect of "we ought to respect the elderly" being added on top of it can never be sufficient to warrant such implication. The moral imperative itself, furthermore, cannot be derived from oldness or elderliness. These two, taken together, in Sham's view, combine to render Gaozi's external theory of rightness untenable.[6] b. Mencius' view: Mencius, by contrast, holds an opposite position to that of Gaozi and argues for it with a metaphor in 6A:1 that the xing of water is to flow downward which means that this is its natural way. This is quite unlike the case in which a piece of wood is carved into furniture in that this violates the very nature of the wood. Mencius explains that although every natural way of a thing is the xing of that thing, not every natural way of a thing is the xing of the thing that serves to differentiate the species to which the thing belongs from those species to which it does not belong (6A:3). Consequently, Mencius makes two interrelated points about human xing: (1) that goodness is not just the xing of the human, it is human xing, it is what makes a human human; and so (2) that goodness is intrinsic to human beings. B. Two levels of human nature These points serve for Mencius to distinguish two levels of human nature.[7] He says, ¡§The way the mouth is disposed towards tastes, the eyes towards colors, the ear towards sounds, the nose towards smells, and the four limbs towards ease is human nature, yet therein also lies the Decree. That is why the gentleman does not describe it as nature. The way benevolence pertains to the relation between father and son, duty to the relation between prince and subject, the rites to the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the good and wise man, the sage to the way of Heaven, is the Decree, but therein also lies human nature. That is why the gentleman does not describe it as Decree."[8] The first level concerns a human being's inborn animality, that which he shares with other animals like the desire for sex and food. But contrary to Gaozi, and in fact to the prevalent view that this is what is meant by xing,[9] he prefers to call this level of human nature mingg or Decree (in D. C. Lau's translation). The second level, according to Mencius, is what makes human distinctively human, that which he doesn't share with other animals. That level, which is what characterizes human being and sets him apart from animals, is Xing or humanity (or nature in D. C. Lau's translation). Mencius advocates that human goodness is consistent with his natural way, meaning that there is an inclination intrinsic to our nature to do good, that to do good is not something that is commanded from the outside nor is it induced from the outside or someone, be it human or super-natural. Likewise, Professor Si-guang Lao, in the Internet version of his A Lexicon of Confucian Terms, explains that the meaning of the word xing prevalent in the ancient time prior to and synchronic with Mencius refers to the inborn capacity of human being. This meaning, if not being neutral as regards the goodness of xing, seems at least not to carry any sense of the goodness that Mencius claims. Mencius, however, deliberately deviates with regard to the usage of xing from his counterparts by giving it a new meaning such that it specifically refers to that which, though slight and subtle, makes him different from the animals.[10] This deviation, from our analysis above, serves exactly to make a distinction between the two levels of human nature. Put differently, we can say that Mencius distinguishes xing from human xing. This gives textual evidence to the assertion that Mencius characterizes human xing in a very narrow sense as contradistinctive to Gaozi's broad sense which includes everything that there is in human nature. Mencius recognizes that goodness is not everything that there is in human xing, that there are different aspects in it only some of which can be the basic core that it is, so to speak, composed of. For others, he quickly discards as un-essential to human xing. What is essential to human xing is that part which inclines us to goodness, or more specifically, to the four cardinal virtues. C. The existentio-moral nature of Mencius' arguments One thing that should not go unnoticed is the nature of the arguments as advanced by Mencius. From the logical point of view, most of these arguments contained herein are either fallacious or simply not arguments at all. Mencius always resorts to shifting the premises of his opponents or twisting the meanings or referents of the concepts being in use.[11] Most of his arguments are at best illustrative or are arguments by analogy which are widely notorious for its lack of logical force. Take, for example, "the Falling Child into the Well" argument, one of his famous "proofs" for establishing his xing shan lunh, or "a goodness theory of human nature". In a sense, all it can purport to do is to illustrate how a person would be emotionally stirred if being put in such a border-situation.[12] Whether it can be generalized should be subject to further investigation which should probably be more of an empirical nature. The argument in itself is not so much logical as it is speculative. Yet, as one of a renowned Chinese scholars has it, Mencius' arguments are meant to be existentio-moral ones highlighting human border-situation rather than logical.[13] He says, "If, for example, your life, which has been in great danger, is now saved by a man of jeni you cannot help, as a human being, being awakened to moral reciprocity deeply rooted in the original goodness of man; you must also reach a non-egoistic conclusion that man (including yourself) ought to lay down his life for the sake of morality (jen-yi) in the border-situation. This point is not a matter of logical reasoning or purely intellectualistic argument; it is a matter of human awakening to the original goodness of man [italics mine] on the higher level of human nature."[14] On this account, therefore, we can re-interpret Mencius's example of the falling child into the well. It is meant to argue for the premises that human nature is inherently good by basing solely on the observation that the one who feels a sense of compassion has such a feeling out of, and by virtue of, his own spontaneity, i.e., totally without any prior thoughts. Mencius' illustration, therefore, is meant to arouse the existential awareness of our inner being the very substance of which is worth of further development. This understanding is important especially when we consider an opposing view that the fact that the man has such a feeling is because he can derive a sense of pleasure and internal award out of, and in the very act of having, such a sense of compassion. That is to say, according this view, to have such a feeling of compassion is basically an act of selfish gratification orienting to oneself but not to the one to whom this sense of compassion is supposed to direct. To think along this line is to miss the fact that the feeling comes into being all of a sudden without any prior deliberations, and that it is totally spontaneous.[15] Having Mencius's inherent theory of morality explicated, we now turn to Xunzi and look at his external theory of morality. We try first to make sense of his theory along with his view on the origin and function of Li. Then we proceed to discuss why he favors an external authority of morality in the light of his xing e lunj, or "an evilness theory of human nature."[16] III. Xunzi's external theory of morality A. Xunzi's view on the origin of Li Xunzi's view on Li is closed tied with his conjecture on why men should live in society. According to him, it is a necessity for human being to live in society. Thus he says, "from birth all men are capable of forming societies"[17]. This is because, first and foremost, human being is born with needs and these needs have to be satisfied. Resources that can satisfy human needs, however, are deplorably limited. An individual engaging in struggling for limited resources are bound to run into conflicts with other individuals. And as a result, every party will only end up a loser. To be a member in a society and follow a series of behavioral requirement, therefore, would make everyone stand to benefit. This is a crude view of Xunzi on the origin of society. When we come to further understand the function and origin of Li in relation to the satisfaction of human needs, we have to appreciate first the fact that there are at least two senses of Li. In its narrow sense, Li refers to the totality of moral codes which govern the behavior of human interaction in concrete life situations. In its broad sense, however, it can be taken to refer to the whole of institutions contrived, whether they are so contrived in a conscious manner (as in the case of laws) or in a spontaneous manner (as in the case of barter), by human beings for the total regulation of social operation. Both of these two senses are embraced by Xunzi. Although, in his case, the narrow sense is primary and the broad sense derivative, it is the latter, however, that is most discussed. Before the Pre-Chin masters, there were already remarks about the role played by institutions in human existence. One of the oft-cited lines quoted from The Classics of Poems, which runs as "Heaven gives birth to the multitude of people endowing each being with its corresponding principles. The people who are so morally endowed love these beautiful virtues"[18], is widely taken to be one of the precursors that gives inspiration to the advocation of Xing Shan Lun, implied in Confucius, espoused by Mencius and adopted by the main-stream Confucian scholars. While this is certainly true, we can, however, also construe it as a remark pertaining to an awareness of, at least, the existence of institutions in human interaction. Wuk and Zel, translated here as "principles", can be taken to mean the principles governing the establishment of a peaceful order in the human society, which in one word boils down to be 'institutions'. As, Cheng Hong, one of the most prominent economists in Mainland China makes an observation in connection with that line quoted above, "Despite the fact that these lines have not yet ventured into the inquiry of the origin of institutions, there are two points that worth noticing. One, they show an awareness of the existence of institutions in human society. Two, they believe that institutions are generated beyond any single individual's rationality."[19] The study of the origin of Li, or institutions here, was taken by Xunzi, who says, ¡§In physical power they are not so good as an ox, I swiftness they do not equal the horse; yet the ox and horse can be put to their use. Why s that? I say it is because humans alone can form societies and animals cannot. Why can man form a society? I say it is due to the division of society into classes. How can social divisions be translated into behavior? I say it is because of humans' sense of morality and justice. Thus, if their sense of morality and justice is used to divide society into classes, concord will result. If there is concord between the classes, unity will result; if there is unity, great physical power will result; if there is great physical power, real strength will result; if there is real strength, all objects can be overcome. For this reason, humans can acquire palaces and houses where they can dwell in safety. Thus, that they put the four seasons in their proper sequence, control the myriad of things, universally benefit the whole world, is due to no other cause than that they have developed social classes from their sense of morality and justice. Accordingly from birth all men are capable of forming societies. If a society is formed without social divisions, strife would result; if there is strife, disorder ensues; if there is disorder, fragmentation results; if there is fragmentation, weakness comes; if there is weakness, it is impossible to triumph over objects."[20] It is quite clear from this that Xunzi assigns a very high place to the forming of society and to society itself. Society is so important to human species that any harm levied upon it would only mean pain and suffering for every individual that dwells in it. And to prevent such an awkward situation, Li is being called for. For Xunzi, there is no society possible without Li. Having set forth his point of view on the social necessity of Li, Xunzi proceeds to conjecture how the concrete system of Li has come into being. He gives the credit to the Sage Kings: ¡§In ancient time, the Sage Kings took human nature to be evil, and thought people were partial, malicious, and not upright; shiftless, chaotic, and not governed. For this reason they established for them ritual and morality. They instituted laws and norms in order to reform and adorn human essence and nature, and straighten it; in order to tame and transform human essence and nature, and guide it. Only then did order ensue, in accordance with what is the Way."[21] Although it can be challenged by questioning the very human nature of the Sage Kings who, being human should likewise be evil in nature, are not supposed to be able to institute laws and norms for common folks and people, it, nevertheless, has at least the merit of asserting that Li, or institutions in general, is instituted from the outside without which social chaos would be resulted to the disadvantage of society. Xunzi's fundamental principles bear a striking resemblance to contemporary Western Economics, especially to the Neo-Institutional School as pioneered by figures like Ronald Coase, and championed by prominent Economists like Steven Ng-sheung Cheung, Armen Alchian, Oliver Williamson and Douglass North etc., most of who are Nobel Naureates[22]. They invariably take property right as the most important institution in society that regulates human interactions. The respect for property right, which culminates in the institutionalization of it, not only guarantees a stable interpersonal operation on a societal scale, but most important of all is the basic structure on which a human society is, and can only be, built. Their works provide insights into how we can better understand Xunzi with regard to his view on the origin of Li. While Xunzi is remarkably similar to Neo-Institutionalism with regard to the origin and function of institutions, there is, nevertheless, one important difference between them. They differ, at least, in terms of the motivation with which they carry out their investigation. Neo-Institutionalism does so in the interest of finding out the best way to allocate resources such that the "transaction cost" of an economic operation can be reduced (hence Neo-Institutionalism is sometimes called "transaction cost economics"). Xunzi does so in an endeavor to keep human interaction as harmonious as possible, of restoring the order, social & political. Put in the historical context, he takes fu Lim, or returning to Li, to be the best antidote to the political confusion during the Warring State Period. In the course of expounding the function of Li, Xunzi ventures into the study of human nature and concludes with his well-known evilness theory of human nature. In what follows, we shall give an attempt to examine why he takes human nature to be evil. B. Xunzi's evilness theory of human nature Xunzi writes, ¡§Human nature is evil; what is good is artifice.[23] Now, human nature is as follows. At birth, there is fondness for profit in it. Following this, contention and robbery arise, and deference and courtesy are destroyed. At birth there is envy and hatred in it. Following this, violence and banditry arise, and loyalty and trust are destroyed. At birth there are the desires of the ear and eye, there is fondness for sound and color in it. Following this, perversion and chaos arise, and ritual, morality, refinement, and order are destroyed. Thus obeying human nature, following one's essence, must result in contention and robbery. This is in accordance with the violation of [social] division and disruption in the natural order, and a return to turmoil."[24] Here Xunzi argues that human nature is inherently evil in three senses: (1) A love of profit is inborn in man. If he follows this instinct, then strife would be resulted, (2) Hatred and envy are inborn in man. If he follows this instinct, then lots of human virtues would be sacrificed, and, (3) Desires of the senses are inborn in human nature. If he follows this instinct, then disorderly behavior and seizure would combine to ruin social life.[25] Xunzi, however, is not consistent all the time in his view of human nature. Having said what he has said above concerning human nature, he says, "what is so by birth is called xing"[26]. What is so by birth includes, not only natural desires and natural instincts, but also an inherent ability to know both empirical truths and truths about justice and virtues. Thus, he says, "Men from birth have awareness"[27] and "¡Kit is clear that the man in the street can become a Yu, since it is possible for every man to understand the substance of humaneness, morality, the model of law, and rectitude and the ability to master their instruments."[28] These two, taken together, point to the notion that it is part of the human xing to have an inborn ability to know, whether it is a piece of common truth or a truth about morality. It is precisely for this observation that Fu-guang Xu asserts that Xunzi's xing e lun is by no means comprehensive and might not even be as complete as Gaozi's xing wu shan wu e luno or "Neutral theory of human nature"[29] Yat-shing Sham has contended with Xu and concluded with cogent arguments that Xunzi's theory has a much deeper understanding of human nature than that of Gaozi's.[30] No matter it is Xu or Sham that we side with, the point here is that both of them agree that Xunzi does not have a unified theory of human nature. The moot point here is: what exactly does Xunzi mean by e? On Xu's account, Xunzi asserts that human nature is evil only in so far as human inborn desires are concerned.[31] But for Da-qi Chen, "The real issue for xing e [lun] is not so much with psychological inborn sentiments as it is with the outcome resulted from the blind following of them. It is by virtue of the "pian xian bei luanp" (or evil as what is wrong through partiality, what wickedly contravenes natural principles, what is perverse, and what is rebellious)[32] resulted from the behavior itself that Xunzi reaches the conclusion that human nature is evil."[33] Granted this difference though, there is one thing that the two share in common: that Xunzi does take what is manifest in behavior as the basic component in terms of which human nature is defined, and defined as evil. This interpretation of Xunzi is also echoed in some other scholars' works. Jie-xian Li juxtaposes "pian xian bei luan" with "zheng li pin zhiq"(or good as what is correct, in accord with natural principles, peaceful, and well-ordered).[34] He takes Xunzi to mean by good and evil the end-outcome of human behavior or behavioral objective rather than the motive behind. According to Li, what is good, for Xunzi, is defined by the capacity of an object to fulfill a purpose; what is evil, by contrast, is characterized by its being unable to do so. Human nature, therefore, is measured against this: insofar as human nature can, on its own, fulfill the objective of zheng li pin zhi in society, it is good; insofar as it cannot, it is evil. Since human nature is wrought by desires, the blind following of them makes it impossible for him to reach the state of zheng li pin zhi, therefore it is imperative, for Xunzi, to conclude that human nature is evil. IV. Coda Enough has been said on Mencius and Xunzi with regard to their views on human nature. I believe it is justified to say now that, as far as the definitions of inherent and external theories of human nature are concerned, Mencius is apparently convinced that the ultimate source of morality and moral acts lies within human nature, while Xunzi is fully convicted to the idea that that source lies without. The question here is: which one of these two theories is more preferable. But what is it for a theory to be more preferable is subjected to the different conceptions of what is good, and concomitantly of what is not, and, not to mention, the question that it is good for what. These questions, however, are far too complicated to be treated here.[35] I am contented here to make three points: (1) The value of Xunzi's theory lies in the fact that it accords more with the observation of our daily life than that of Mencius does. Our experience in concrete life-situation compels us to conclude that it is infested with, for example, greediness resulted from and conflicts given rise by the attending of desires. It is yet the border-situation in our life which inspires Mencius to deploy the "Child falling into well" analogy that makes it imperative for us to draw the conclusion that this is what is essential about human being. (2) Xunzi's conception of human nature is based on his failure to see that wrongdoings arise only when one's existence is being threatened. He takes the satisfaction of desires as evil and the conflicts resulted from satisfying them when struggling for resources with someone else is involved as strife. But he is mistaken about this. The very satisfaction of a desire, the basic motive of survival, taken in themselves, cannot be said to be evil. Human would be engaged in conflict only insofar as their legitimate claims are threatened. As Robert Allinson has it, "Hsun Tzu [Xunzi]is correct in tracing the origin of evil (at least in part), to certain emotional states; it is only that he has not recognized that these states are not inherent to human nature¡Kwhat he has identified as part of human nature is a second derivative."[36] (3) Another problem with Xunzi's xing e lun is that if human nature is evil and Li is here called for to rectify the situation, the theory itself, granted that it is true, would defeat the very purpose of Li. As Chih-yi Cheng rightly observes, "[the] over-emphasis on [the: sic] Li as a means of political control cannot avoid producing a type of morality that is both artificial and insincere."[37] To the extent that these three remarks do seem to make sense, it is here concluded that although Xunzi is closer to our experience, Mencius succeeds in unraveling the veil behind it and uncover our human nature. Chinese Glossary a Gaozi §i¤l b Dai Zhen À¹¾_ c li § d yi ¸q e xing ©Ê f Ch¡¦u ·¡ g ming ©R h xing shan lun ©Êµ½½× i jen ¤¯ j xing e lun ©Ê´c½× k Wu ª« l Ze «h m fu Li ´_§ n wei °° o xing wu shan wu e lun ©ÊµLµ½µL´c½× p pian xian bei luan °¾ÀI®¯¶Ã q zheng li pin zhi ¥¿²z¥­ªv -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] The Mencius. Book 6A: 1, translated by Dim-cheuk Lau, London: Penguin Books, 1970. [2] The Mencius. Book 6A: 2. [3] The Mencius. Book 6A: 3. [4] The Mencius. Book 6A: 4. [5] Sham Yat-shing §Â·¸¦¨, ¡§White man and old horse¡¨ (¡u¥Õ¤H»Pªø°¨¡v), E Hu Xue Zhi, ÃZ´ò¾Ç»x, Vol. 18, Taipei: Wenjin, 1997, pp. 1-22. [6] Ibid., p. 20. [7] This view of mine is inspired by Charles Wei-hsun Fu, "The Mencian theory of Mind (Hsin) and Nature (Hsing)", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 10 (1983) 385-410. [8] The Mencius, Book 7B: 24. [9] The Mencius. Book 6A: 3. [10] Lao Si-Guang, ³Ò«ä¥ú, http://hermes.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/ConfLex/. Quoted here is my own paraphrase. The original is ¡u©Ê¦r¦b¥j¥N¤é±`»y¨¥¤¤­ì«ü¥Í¦Ó¨ã¦³¤§¯à ¤O¡A¦ý©s¤l±ý±j½Õ¤H»P¨ä¥L°Êª«¤§¤£¦P¡]§Y©Ò¿×¡u¤H¤§²§©ó¸VÃ~ªÌ¡v¡^¡A¬G¥H¡u©Ê¡v ¦r«ü¤H¥Í¦Ó¨ã¦³¤S¤£¬°¨ä¥L°Êª«©Ò¦³¤§¯à¤O¡A¥H¦¹Åã¥Ü¤H¤§¤å¤Æ¤§°ò¦¥i¯à©Ê©Ò ¦b¡C¤£¥u«ü¥Í¦Ó¨ã¦³¤§¯à¤O¡C¡v [11] cf., for example, Zhu-han Yang, An expository note on Mencius ©s¤l¸q²z²¨ ¸Ñ,Taipei: E Hu Publication, 1983. [12] For a penetrating and ground-breaking study on ¡§border-situation¡¨, cf. Lap-chuen Tsang ´¿¥ß¦s, A Theory of the Sublime, Rochester: Rochester University Press, 1998, chapter one in particular. This work is prefaced by Alasdir MacIntyre and is currently being ranked among the top three in many lists of works pertaining to the study of the Sublime on the Internet. [13] Charles Wei-hsun Fu, Op. Cit. [14] Ibid., p. 399. [15][15] Cf. Allinson, p. 40. [16] Xunzi's xing e lun is often translated as "human nature is evil" or "human nature is bad". But in order to make it on a par with Mencius' "goodness theory of human nature", as I render it here, I, fully aware of the discrepancy between mine and the literature, render Xunzi's as "evilness theory of human nature" after the fashion of giving nomenclature for many theories in the western philosophy literature like Gilbert Ryle's "dispositional theory of beliefs". For the regular translation, see, for example, Paul Goldin, Rituals of the Way, Chicago: Open Courts, 1999. For Ryle, see his The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson & Company, 1949. [17] ¡§On the Regulations of a King¡¨, Book 9, Xunzi, translated by John Knoblock, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. The Chinese original is: ¡u¬G¤H¥Í¤£¯àµL ¸s¡v [18] ¸Ö¤j¶®¡G¡u¤Ñ¥Í»]¥Á¡A¦³ª«¦³«h¡A¥Á¤§ªÃÂU¡A¦n¬Oœº¼w¡v [19] Cheng Hong (²±¬x), ¡§The application of Neo-institutionalism in China¡¨ (¡u·s ¨î«×¸gÀپǦb¤¤°êªºÀ³¥Î¡v), A Collection of Cheng Hong¡¦s Works (¡m²±¬x¶°¡n), Harbin: Heilongjiang Education Publishers, 1996, p.234. [20] ¡§On the Regulations of a King¡¨, Book 9, Xunzi,. The Chinese original is: ¤O¤£­Y¤û¡A¨«¤£­Y°¨¡A¦Ó¤û°¨¬°¥Î¡A¦ó¤]¡H¤ê¡G¤H¯à¸s¡A©¼¤£¯à¸s¤]¡C¤H¦ó¥H¯à ¸s¡H¤ê¡G¤À¡C¤À¦ó¥H¯à¦æ¡H¤ê¡G¥H¸q¡C¬G¸q¥H¤À«h©M¡A©M«h¤@¡A¤@«h¦h¤O¡A¦h¤O «h¾Ê¡A¾Ê«h³Óª«¡A¬G®c«Ç¥i±o¦Ó©~¤]¡C¬G§Ç¥|®É¡Aµô¸Uª«¡A­Ý§Q¤Ñ¤U¡AµL¥¦¬G²j¡A ±o¤§¤À¸q¤]¡C ¬G¤H¥Í¤£¯àµL¸s¡A¸s¦ÓµL¤À«hª§¡Aª§«h¶Ã¡A¶Ã§OÂ÷¡AÂ÷«h®z¡A®z «h¤£¯à³Óª«¡C [21] Xunzi, Book 17. The Chinese original is: ¡u¥jªÌ¡A¸t¤ý¥H¤H¤§©Ê´c¡A¥H¬°°¾ÀI ¦Ó¤£¥¿¡A®¯¶Ã¦Ó¤£ªv¡A¬O¥H¬°¤§°_§¸q¨îªk«×¡A¥HÁB¹¢¤H¤§±¡©Ê¦Ó¥¿¤§¡A¥HÂZ¤Æ ¤H¤§±¡©Ê¦Ó¾É¤§¤]¡A©l¥X©óªv¡A¦X©ó¹DªÌ¤]¡v [22] For R. Coase, see his epoch-making work "The Nature of Firm" and "The Social Cost"; for D. North, "Institution, Institutional Change". For a comparison between Pre-Chin philosophers and Neo-institutioanlists, cf. Cheng Hong, ibid. [23] Some translations render "Wei"n as "acquired". While "artifice" is a proper translation, "acquired" seems to be more capable of capturing what Xunzi purports to say. I still prefer the former, however, because it, as a noun, is a better candidate for analysis than the latter, which, as an adjective, lacks the sense of the process of taking up things from the outside. [24] Xunzi, Book 17, translation here is by Paul Goldin, op. cit. The Chinese original is: ¤H¤§©Ê´c¡A¨äµ½ªÌ°°¤]¡C¤µ¤H¤§©Ê¡A¥Í¦Ó¦³¦n¦æ²j¡A¶¶¬O¡A¬Gª§¹Ü¥Í¡A¦ÓÃã Åý§Ñ²j¡C¥Í¦Ó¦³¯e´c²j¡A¶¶¬O¡A¬G´Ý¸é¥Í¡A¦Ó©¾«H§Ñ²j¡C¥Í¦Ó¦³¦Õ¥Ø¤§±ý¡A¦³¦n Án¦â²j¡A¶¶¬O¡A¬G²]¶Ã¥Í¡A¦Ó§¸q¤å²z§Ñ²j¡AµM«h±q¤H¤§©Ê¡A¶¶¤H¤§±¡¡A¥²¥X©ó ª§¹Ü¡A¦X©ó¥Ç¤À¶Ã²z¡A¦ÓÂk©ó¼É¡C [25] Here I have taken extensively from John Knoblock, "introduction", Chapter 17, Book III, ibid., p. 141. [26] ibid., ¡§Rectifying Names¡¨, Chapter 18, the Chinese original is:¡u¥Í¤§©Ò¥HµM ªÌ¡A¿×¤§©Ê¡v. [27] ibid., ¡§Dispelling Blindness¡¨, Chapter 21, the Chinese original is: ¡u¤H¥Í¦Ó¦³ ª¾¡v. [28] ibid., ¡§Man¡¦s Nature is Evil¡¨, Chapter 23, the Chinese original is: ¡u¶î¤§¤H ¤]¡A¬Ò¦³¥i¥Hª¾¤¯¸qªk¥¿¤§½è¡A¬Ò¦³¥i¥H¯à¤¯¸qªk¥¿¤§¨ã¡FµM«h¨ä¥i¥H¬°¬ê©ú¨o¡v [29] Xu Fu-guang, ®}´_Æ[ The History of the Chinese Philosophy of Human Nature, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1982, p. 255. [30] See Sham Yat-shing §Â·¸¦¨, ¡§An Analysis on Xunzi¡¦s xing e lun¡¨ (¡u¯û¤l ©Ê´c½×ªR¸q¡v) , E Hu Xue Zhi, ÃZ´ò¾Ç»x, Vol. 3, Taipei: Wenjin, 1989, pp. 1-58. [31] Xu Fu-guang, op. cit., p. 255. [32] Xunzi, op. cit. ¡§Man¡¦s Nature is Evil¡¨, Chapter 23, the Chinese original is: ¡u°¾ÀI®¯¶Ã¡v. [33] Chen Da-qi ³¯¤j»ô, The Philosophy of Xunzi ¯û¤l¾Ç»¡, Taipei: Chinese Cultural Enterprise, 1954, p. 144. Quoted from Ma Guo-yiau °¨°êº½, Xunzi¡¦s Political Theory & its Application ¯û¤l¬Fªv²z½×»P¹ê½î, Taipei: Wenshijie Publishers, 1996, p. 67. [34] Li Jie-xian §õ­õ½å, The Central Thesis of Xunzi ¯û¤l¤§®Ö¤ß«ä·Q, Taipei: Wenjin Publishers, 1994, p. 70. [35] The way I frame this question is inspired by Bernard Williams, Morality: an introduction to ethics, New York: Harper & Row, 1972. [36] Robert Allinson, "The debate between Mencius & Hsun-tzu [Xunzi]: contemporary application", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 25 (1988), p. 39. [37] Cheng Chih-yi, Hsuntzu's Theory of Human Nature and its Influence on Chinese Thought, PhD Thesis, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1928, p. 56. Copyright (c) Hong Kong Society of Humanistic Philosophy. All Rights Reserved.